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Ensuring that its citizens have access to high-quality schooling and 
health care is among a government’s most important roles. Health and 
education—which enhance human capital—are widely believed to pro-
mote economic growth: schooling and health measures have both been 
linked to increased gross domestic product (GDP), and there are well-
grounded reasons to believe that health and education boost worker 
productivity and, in turn, income. In addition, bolstering the health and 
education of children from poor families is one of the most powerful 
ways to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty and allow 
families to rise out of poverty. Moreover, health and education are basic 
human rights of every citizen, and governments are responsible for 
safeguarding these rights (United Nations 1948, Articles 25 and 26). 
While there does exist private-sector provision of both health and 
education services in developing countries, the government is typically 
the main provider in these countries. In part, the government is fi lling in 
for a poorly developed private market, but there are also several reasons 
why governments have a natural role in these spheres, such as disease 
prevention or the externalities from having an educated population. Not 
only does the government account for a large share of the provision 
of services in the education and health care sectors, but education and 
health care also make up a large share of government spending. Health 
care and education account for over a third of the public-sector work-
force in developing countries (Clements et al. 2010).
Unfortunately, governments in developing countries often do a 
poor job of delivering health care and education to their citizens. This 
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chapter will focus on the ways in which governance challenges reduce 
the quality of education and health care provision in developing coun-
tries. In particular, I will consider ways in which corruption and poor 
oversight of the workforce reduce the effi cacy of these sectors. I will 
document the causes, different manifestations, and extent of these prob-
lems. I will also discuss a range of promising policy solutions that have 
been adopted to address the problems, such as fi nancial incentives, 
leveraging technological advancements to improve monitoring, infor-
mation sharing through media outlets, and empowering stakeholders to 
improve accountability.
HEALTH AND EDUCATION INDICATORS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Despite the aforementioned reasons for governments to invest in 
the health of their populations, both health inputs and health outcomes 
tend to be much worse in poor countries than in rich countries. The 
highest neonatal and under-fi ve mortality rates are found in develop-
ing countries. This fi nding is unsurprising, but what is staggering is 
the magnitude of the gap between rich and poor countries: under-fi ve 
mortality rates in 2000 range from 241 deaths per 1,000 births to 4 
deaths per 1,000 births (World Bank 2014). Health inputs exhibit the 
same pattern as health outcomes. For example, the child immunization 
rate is highly correlated with a country’s GDP per capita.
Education levels in developing countries are also low. In such 
countries, 37 percent of the population aged 25 and over has no school-
ing, compared to 4 percent in developed countries. A similar pattern is 
seen in the percentage of people with a secondary-school education or 
higher—27 percent in developing countries compared to 68 percent in 
developed countries (Barro and Lee 2001).
The quality of available health and education services and not sim-
ply low take-up is at the heart of the problem. For example, those who 
do attend school in developing countries often receive a low-quality 
education. Schoellman (2012) uses U.S. census data to estimate returns 
to schooling for foreign-educated immigrants working in the United 
States. By comparing immigrants who were educated in, say, Nigeria 
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to those educated in France, he calculates how much money an extra 
year of schooling in Nigeria is worth in the U.S. labor market compared 
to an extra year of schooling in France. This estimate provides a met-
ric of school quality in the different origin countries. When this proxy 
for school quality is compared with GDP per capita, there is a strong 
positive relationship between a country’s GDP and school quality. 
Schoellman fi nds that differences in education quality are as important 
as differences in years of schooling when decomposing the variation in 
human capital accumulation across countries.
Poor-quality education also negatively affects school enrollment 
rates: parents have less of a reason to send their children to a school 
where they are not learning, and students have less interest in attending 
a school where they are not engaged. An eye-opening report featured 
interviews with parents in India about their children’s schooling 
(PROBE 1999). In 8 percent of the cases where boys were withdrawn 
from school and 18 percent of the cases where girls were withdrawn 
from school, parents reported that the reason for their having taken their 
child out of school was poor teaching. Poor quality also stops parents 
from ever enrolling their children in school in the fi rst place for 8 per-
cent of boys and 1 percent of girls. One mother in the state of Madhya 
Pradesh explained why she had never sent her daughter, Rukmini, to 
school: “If we send the girl to school, we have to pay a labourer to 
replace her, and the girl learns nothing. What do we gain? See this other 
child who is in class 5. She knows nothing. My son Parkash studied till 
class 6—he knows nothing” (ibid., p. 27).
The quality of health care is also often inadequate. One dimension 
of quality is the level of effort health care providers exert. A study in 
urban India investigated this aspect of quality by comparing providers’ 
actions in a hypothetical test environment to observed practices in the 
clinic (Das and Hammer 2005). The study interviewed and observed a 
representative sample of both public and private health care providers. 
The health care providers participated in “vignettes” in which trained 
research staff acted out various hypothetical health scenarios. Doctors 
were scored on the questions they asked the “patients,” diagnosis, and 
recommended treatment. Vignette scores were used to assign a com-
petence score to each provider—how much the provider knew. One 
month after this exercise, research staff observed providers in their 
actual practice for a full working day and scored each patient interac-
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tion based on the amount of time the health care provider spent with 
the patient, questions the provider asked the patient, examinations, and 
recommendations. These scores were then compared to the vignette 
scores to create a measure of provider effort. A main fi nding is that 
providers’ actual performance was well short of their potential perfor-
mance: providers knew what to do but did not do it in practice. Among 
providers with a medical degree, those in the private sector completed 
only 60 percent of the activities they knew to be important, and those 
in the public sector completed only 33 percent. Thus, the problem was 
particularly acute for public health care providers. Differences in effort 
were most salient in poor neighborhoods, where patients appeared to be 
better off visiting private providers rather than public providers, despite 
the fact that public providers were more qualifi ed and presumably less 
expensive.
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN THE HEALTH AND 
EDUCATION SECTORS
As described above, in many cases governments in developing 
countries are failing to provide high-quality health care and education. 
One important factor is poor governance, which I defi ne as the inef-
fi cient management and use of the available resources, often owing to 
malfeasance or shirking by government employees. While governance 
does not account for all of the problems in the health care and edu-
cation sectors—the available fi nancial and human resources are often 
very limited—it plays a central role. The governance problems run the 
gamut, from graft and bribery to absenteeism and indolence among 
employees.
Graft
Perhaps the simplest type of governance problem is theft of fi nancial 
resources. A well-known World Bank study in Uganda “followed the 
money” to document the extent of graft by local bureaucrats (Reinikka 
and Svensson 2004). The central government in Uganda disbursed edu-
cation grants to individual schools based on the number of students 
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enrolled. By tracking the disbursements and then the amount received 
by the schools, the study found that schools received on average only 
20 percent of the amount they were entitled to. The median percentage 
of the federal grant received was 0 percent! The missing money appar-
ently was captured by local bureaucrats and was not reallocated to other 
public uses but rather was stolen for personal use. While this is just one 
specifi c example, it is representative of what is widely believed to be a 
prevalent problem: bureaucrats skim off some of the money that should 
be spent to buy supplies, maintain facilities, and pay teachers and health 
care workers.
Informal Payments
Government employees can also enrich themselves by demanding 
“informal payments” for services that should be rendered for free or 
at a specifi ed rate. Essentially, the government employee is extracting 
a bribe in exchange for performing a service that he is contractually 
obligated to provide even if this bribe is not paid. Lewis (2007) reviews 
the literature on informal payments in the health sector and highlights 
the prevalence of the practice across countries for basic services such 
as admission to the hospital or receipt of subsidized medications. She 
reports on a survey in Bangalore, India, by Gopakumar (1998) that 
found that 51 percent of community members surveyed had paid bribes 
in government hospitals, while 89 percent had paid bribes in hospitals 
in small towns. In one of the more egregious examples cited, individu-
als reported having to pay bribes to nurses in maternity homes so that 
mothers could see their newborns.
A related phenomenon is seen in schooling, though perhaps less 
frequently. In crowded classes, teachers sometimes ask parents to pay a 
fee so their child can sit in the front of the classroom and get more atten-
tion. It is also not unheard of for a teacher to demand payment in order 
to advance the student to the next grade or give high marks. 
Absenteeism
Worker absenteeism is a major challenge in both the health care 
and the education sectors: employees simply do not show up to work. 
Banerjee, Deaton, and Dufl o (2004) document absence rates in health 
up15sapeogch5.indd   97 5/27/2015   1:14:18 PM
98   Jayachandran
care facilities using survey data from public and private medical pro-
viders, as well as traditional healers, in a poor, rural district of India. In 
the public sector, absence rates were verifi ed by weekly, in-person visits 
(random spot checks) to public health facilities over the course of one 
year. Subcenters and aid posts (the lowest-tier health facilities) suffer 
from the highest rates of absenteeism: those performing the spot checks 
found that 56 percent of facilities were closed during normal working 
hours. In contrast, primary and community health centers (PHCs and 
CHCs) were closed only 3 percent of the time when the spot checkers 
showed up. However, when facilities were open, both subcenters and 
PHCs/CHCs were understaffed: the fraction of allocated medical staff 
found during a visit averaged 55 percent for subcenters and 64 percent 
for PHCs/CHCs. One perilous consequence of this low-quality govern-
ment care is that it drives patients to private care. In rural India, private 
health care providers are often severely underqualifi ed. In the area stud-
ied by Banerjee, Deaton, and Dufl o, 82 percent of private providers 
reported that they had no medical training whatsoever.
This pattern of absenteeism is supported by cross-country data 
from Chaudhury et al. (2006). Survey teams in six countries made two 
to three in-person visits to a (nearly) nationally representative sample 
of primary schools and primary health centers. On average, the educa-
tion sector suffered from an absence rate of 19 percent, while the health 
sector had an absence rate of 35 percent. Absence rates declined as per 
capita income increased, especially in the education sector.
Shirking
The absence rates described above may understate the severity of 
just how poor the provision of service may be, in that providers who 
are present may not actually be working. Chaudhury et al. (2006) 
found that in India teachers who were present during spot checks were 
actually teaching only 45 percent of the time. Even this statistic may 
overestimate effort, as teachers were counted as teaching in instances 
where they were only keeping the class in order and not actually teach-
ing. Data from secondary schools in Nepal show a similar, though less 
severe, pattern: 18 percent of teachers failed to teach for the entire class 
period (Jayachandran 2014).
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Perverse Incentives as a Contributing Factor
Government workers’ lack of effort may merely stem from the lack 
of positive incentives to work hard, but in some cases there are per-
verse incentives that reward teachers or health care workers for poor 
performance. Jayachandran (2014) studies the prevalent phenomenon 
of after-school tutoring in government schools in which schoolteachers 
provide for-profi t tutoring to their own students outside of the normal 
school day. The possibility of extra income from tutoring may incentiv-
ize teachers to teach less material during the normal school day, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that their students will need to attend tutoring. 
Jayachandran uses data from a national survey in Nepal to investigate 
the effect of a secondary school offering tutoring on teacher effort and 
student academic achievement. Students in private and public schools 
were asked to report whether they received tutoring, whether or not 
their teacher taught for the entire class period, and other subjective 
information on teacher performance. These data were then linked with 
students’ scores on the national secondary-school exam. After-school 
tutoring in public schools was found to reduce the likelihood that teach-
ers taught for the entire class period by 7 percentage points, a signifi cant 
reduction. Less teaching translated into a lower student performance 
on the secondary-school exam. This fi nding did not carry over to pri-
vate schools, which is not surprising when one considers that private 
schools, unlike public schools, face a fi nancial hit if they teach inad-
equately during the regular school day, since they will lose students and 
hence school-fee revenues. The students hurt most by this practice of 
“self-dealing” are those whose families are too poor to afford tutoring; 
these students are taught less during school than the teacher could have 
feasibly covered, but are not able to learn the missed material by taking 
the tutoring classes.
Reverse or perverse incentives are also found in the health care sec-
tor. Doctors whose wages are linked to the number of medicines, tests, 
or procedures they recommend are more likely to prescribe unneeded 
treatments. This phenomenon is widespread in China, where the anti-
biotic prescription rate is almost double that of other countries. Doctors 
are incentivized to overprescribe by their hospitals, which make money 
from setting higher prices for certain drugs, and also by pharmaceuti-
cal companies, which provide doctors with bonuses to increase sales. 
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A randomized audit study showed that doctors were signifi cantly less 
likely to prescribe antibiotics to patients who signaled they had some 
knowledge that antibiotics might not be needed to treat their symptoms 
(39 percent of such cases received antibiotics) compared to patients 
that did not (64 percent of such cases received antibiotics). Patients 
who demonstrated knowledge about antibiotics were also less likely to 
be prescribed multiple drugs or more expensive drugs (Currie, Lin, and 
Zhang 2011).
In both of these examples—tutoring and overprescription of 
drugs—the problem is worse than bribery. Not only are government 
workers extracting money from citizens, but here, in the pursuit of addi-
tional money for themselves, government workers intentionally provide 
what they know to be lower-quality service, be it less teaching during 
class or unnecessary medicines. 
Why Do These Governance Problems Exist?
There are fundamental reasons why governance problems are 
severe in developing countries and are pervasive in the health care and 
education sectors. Many other government services are based primarily 
in cities or towns, but schools and health clinics are located throughout 
a country. That geographic spread is one underlying reason that moni-
toring workers is diffi cult. Many schools and health posts are located 
in remote villages, causing a twofold problem. First, poor-quality roads 
and inadequate public transportation make it diffi cult for government 
workers to reach their place of work. Second, these same conditions 
also hinder supervisors or auditors from traveling to conduct spot 
checks and worker evaluations. Thus, there is often little monitoring of 
the performance of government workers.
Another contributing factor is that government workers earn a low 
salary by worldwide standards (though they are often well paid relative 
to their skill group in their countries). Many health care and education 
workers moonlight at other jobs to supplement their income. Workers 
with multiple jobs are more likely to be absent if their jobs have con-
fl icting schedules, and they may also exert less effort—for example, a 
teacher might have less time to prepare a lesson.
A third important factor that exacerbates these issues is that consum-
ers are less able to monitor service provision and enforce high quality 
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than they are in wealthier countries. Parents with limited education may 
lack the ability to gauge what their child is learning in school or how 
their local school’s performance compares to other schools in the region 
(Dizon-Ross 2014). Similarly, patients tend to have little knowledge of 
whether or not a health care provider is performing the needed tests, 
asking the appropriate questions, and making an accurate diagnosis. 
Even when stakeholders are aware that services are inadequate, they 
may not have suffi cient leverage or social standing within the commu-
nity to hold providers accountable. It is much more likely that a parent 
in a developing country has less education and status compared to her 
child’s teacher than would be the case in developed countries, simply 
because teachers have a higher position in the society-wide distribu-
tion of schooling attainment in developing countries than in developed 
countries.
Finally, it is often diffi cult to fi re government employees, so govern-
ments have few tools to enforce job requirements and punish shirkers 
even when they are able to monitor workers adequately and would like 
to improve the effort level of the workforce.
Beyond Governance: Limited Resources
It is important to note that there are many factors other than gover-
nance challenges that contribute to poor health and education outcomes 
in developing countries. The amount of available government revenue is 
lower, which means fewer resources for education and health care. This 
translates into larger class sizes and inadequate teaching aids or faulty 
hospital equipment and lack of medicine. Infrastructure is also poor, 
with many facilities lacking water and electricity. These other prob-
lems may very well exacerbate the governance challenges described 
above. In an analysis of cross-country data, teacher absence rates fall 
by 2.7 percentage points with a one standard deviation increase in an 
index measuring school infrastructure. A similar pattern is observed in 
the health care sector, where the availability of potable water at the 
facility signifi cantly decreases the absence rates of health care workers 
(Chaudhury et al. 2006). 
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SOME PROMISING APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
Governments are typically ineffective at monitoring workers and 
enforcing performance standards. While these are diffi cult problems 
to overcome, there has been progress recently through innovative 
approaches by governments to incentivize good performance, monitor 
their workers, and empower citizens to monitor government workers.
Incentive Schemes
A basic but powerful idea in economics is that an employer can 
align workers’ incentives with the employer’s objectives by means of 
pay for performance. Recent pilot programs have shown the benefi ts 
of incentive schemes in improving teacher performance and reducing 
absenteeism in schools. A nonprofi t foundation collaborated with the 
state government in Andhra Pradesh, India, to conduct a randomized 
evaluation of performance pay for teachers in rural primary schools. 
Two schemes were assessed: group bonuses tied to school performance 
and individual bonuses tied to teacher performance. The schemes were 
evaluated over the course of two years, during which student perfor-
mance was assessed at the end of each school year (Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman 2011). Bonuses were awarded if average test scores 
(either for the school or for the individual teacher) increased by at least 
5 percent. The researchers evaluating the program conducted unan-
nounced spot checks to measure student and teacher attendance as well. 
The program, including both schemes, signifi cantly improved student 
performance: scores in language increased by 0.17 standard devia-
tions, and math scores increased by 0.27 standard deviations. As judged 
against other policy innovations in education, these were impressively 
large impacts on student test scores. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
conclude that the improvements in test scores were due to increased 
teacher effort rather than improved teacher or student attendance. An 
innovative feature of the study is that student performance was mea-
sured in subjects such as science and social science, where performance 
was not factored into teacher pay. One concern about teacher incentive 
pay is that teachers might “teach to the test,” and other types of learn-
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ing might suffer. In this case, performance in all subjects improved, 
presumably because the teacher put in more effort across the board, 
or because better student learning in math and language had spillover 
benefi ts to other subjects such as science and social science.
Dufl o, Hanna, and Ryan (2012), whose study is discussed in more 
detail below, analyze another incentive program in schools and fi nd that 
linking incentives for teachers to their attendance improved student test 
scores. 
Technology
A second potential solution to shortcomings in the health care and 
education sectors is to use technology to improve staff monitoring. 
High rates of absenteeism may be due, in part, to the fact that there 
is no accountability for providers. By leveraging advances in tech-
nology, it may be possible to reduce some of the barriers that prevent 
governments from actively monitoring attendance and performance. 
A nongovernmental organization (NGO) in India attempted to reduce 
teacher absences by using cameras to document attendance. Teachers 
were given a digital camera with a tamper-proof date and time stamp 
and were instructed to have a student take one photograph at the begin-
ning of the school day and one at the end of the school day. To be 
considered valid, photographs had to be taken at least fi ve hours apart, 
and both photographs had to have at least eight children pictured with 
the teacher. A randomized evaluation assessed the effectiveness of this 
program using data from unscheduled spot checks by the survey team, 
teacher photos, and student test scores (Dufl o, Hanna, and Ryan 2012). 
The program was found to signifi cantly reduce absence rates in cam-
era schools (where the rate fell to 21 percent) compared to noncamera 
schools (where the absence rate was 42 percent). Student test scores 
in schools with cameras were also signifi cantly higher (by 0.17 stan-
dard deviations), which led to more students from these schools passing 
competency exams to continue their schooling. This positive impact 
on student achievement is an important result because it indicates that 
teachers did not “game the system” and simply show up to work but not 
teach. Rather, the incentive to show up to work increased their teaching 
and, in turn, student learning.
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Even more advanced technology is now being leveraged in the 
health care sector. The state government in Karnataka, India, recently 
launched something known as the Integrated Medical Information and 
Disease Surveillance System (IMIDSS), in which biometric devices 
record health care worker attendance using thumbprints. Attendance 
data is sent in real time to monitors in government headquarters using 
cellular or radio networks. This monitoring is linked to both incentives 
and penalties for the health care workers. A randomized evaluation of 
the effectiveness of this program fi nds that it both increases health care 
worker attendance and improves patient health outcomes (Dhaliwal and 
Hanna 2014).
Citizen Empowerment
Improving citizens’ knowledge can be an important fi rst step 
toward increasing government accountability. Media outlets offer a 
means to increase citizens’ awareness. This approach was used by the 
central government in Uganda in response to learning that grants for 
schools were being siphoned off by local government offi cials, as dis-
cussed above. Prior to the intervention, the average school in the sample 
received only 24 percent of the grant money to which it was entitled. 
In an attempt to increase accountability, the Ugandan government 
launched a newspaper campaign to disseminate information to parents 
and teachers about the federal grants their local school was entitled to. 
Two public-expenditure tracking surveys administered six years apart, 
one pre- and one postintervention, were used to assess the effectiveness 
of the campaign. Data indicated that head teachers’ knowledge of the 
grant programs signifi cantly increased with proximity to a newspaper 
outlet, both in terms of the funding rules and the timing of the release 
of funds (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).1 Increased knowledge led to 
more money reaching schools. With each standard deviation increase 
in head teachers’ knowledge of entitlements, the funds received by the 
school increased by an average of 44 percent. In addition to reducing 
the capture of public funds by larcenous local offi cials, the campaign 
had a positive effect on student enrollment: A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the school’s share of received funding resulted in an increase 
of 297 more students per school.
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While citizens are aware of their personal experiences, there is 
often no way for them to measure quality of services in terms of aggre-
gate outcomes in the community. An intervention in Uganda in 2004 
aimed to empower citizens by providing such aggregated information 
to the community, in this case about health care. Rather than using mass 
media, this intervention brought together local government health care 
workers and community members to disseminate the information and 
discuss how to improve health care provision. The program was found 
to have signifi cantly improved health care delivery and health outcomes 
(Björkman and Svensson 2009). First, researchers surveyed both com-
munity members and health care providers to collect data on health 
outcomes (verifi ed by medical records when possible), health facility 
characteristics, and provider performance. This information was used 
to create a unique report card for each village health care facility, and 
the information on the village’s report card was presented at community 
meetings by local NGOs. These report cards were used as a conver-
sation starting point for community representatives and providers to 
develop action plans for improving service delivery and monitoring. 
The randomized evaluation of the intervention found that health care 
service delivery and health outcomes improved in several signifi cant 
ways: Average waiting time decreased by 12 minutes, from 131 to 
119 minutes, and there was a 0.56 standard deviation increase in the 
index used to measure facility conditions (cleanliness of fl oors, walls, 
furniture, and so forth). Absence rates among service providers also 
declined. Most strikingly, the intervention resulted in several improved 
health outcomes such as child weight and child survival.
An important cautionary note is in order, specifi cally about com-
munity information interventions, but also more broadly about the 
universal applicability of any type of solution. While the results of the 
Ugandan community intervention are promising, other community 
empowerment programs have been found to be less successful. Kremer 
and Holla (2009) outline the null fi ndings of evaluations in two dif-
ferent countries that aimed to empower education stakeholders. One 
intervention in India sought to improve the performance of community 
monitoring committees for schools, which had been ineffective from the 
outset. Survey results showed that few households were aware of these 
committees. Tests were also administered to children to assess school 
quality. Results indicated that parents had an inaccurate understand-
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ing of how much their children were learning. To solve this problem, 
offi cials fashioned an intervention that was aimed at informing the com-
munity about the following areas: school performance, state-mandated 
school requirements, funding, and the responsibilities of the preexist-
ing monitoring committees. Despite the fact that almost 30 percent of 
households attended these meetings, monitoring committees in villages 
that received the intervention were no more effective than committees 
in villages with no intervention. Teacher and student absences were also 
unchanged.
Two programs in Kenya also targeted community monitoring 
bodies for schools. Of note, while the majority of teachers in Kenyan 
schools are directly employed by the government, schools or moni-
toring committees sometimes hire contract teachers to work with the 
government-employed teachers. The fi rst intervention attempted to 
empower these committees by providing prizes which committees 
could bestow on teachers to incentivize them and by facilitating meet-
ings between parents, committee members, and civil-service teachers. 
Results echo those of the empowerment intervention in India—there 
was no effect on teacher absence or student achievement. 
The second program in Kenya aimed to improve committee moni-
toring of contract teacher attendance. While the program did not change 
attendance among contract teachers (which was already relatively high), 
the program did somewhat improve the attendance of civil-service 
teachers, though the results were not statistically signifi cant. Despite 
the fact that there was no signifi cant change in teacher attendance, the 
program did improve student attendance and performance in the class-
rooms of civil-service teachers. 
Thus, while the approach of citizen empowerment had remarkable 
impacts on the health care sector in Uganda, the same approach was 
relatively ineffective on the education sector in Kenya and India. One 
hopes that policymakers, NGOs, and researchers will go back to the 
drawing board and devise other approaches to solve the problem of 
poor-quality education in these latter settings where the fi rst attempt 
failed. These examples serve as a reminder that there is no one-size-fi ts-
all solution, and that the process of improving governance in developing 
countries will be laborious and often frustrating.
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CONCLUSION
The majority of funding in the health care and education sectors 
is spent on provider salaries. For example, 80 percent of India’s health 
care budget is dedicated to provider compensation (Das and Hammer 
2005). A similar pattern is observed in education budgets, where, on 
average, 75 percent of funding goes toward teacher salaries in develop-
ing countries (Kremer and Holla 2009). Thus, improving the quality 
of health and education hinges on improving the performance of the 
workforce. 
There are several basic features of poor countries that create gov-
ernance challenges in monitoring public workers and incentivizing 
them to perform well. Thus, governance problems are pervasive in the 
education and health care sectors and act as a barrier to high-quality 
education and health care services. The lack of high-quality education 
and health care services in turn obstructs educational attainment and 
good health outcomes. While no panacea exists, innovative solutions 
are being developed and tested: redesigning incentive schemes, using 
technology to monitor workers, and empowering citizens with informa-
tion, often disseminated through mass media. There is still much work 
to be done to solve these governance problems, but the problems are 
well worth tackling given the importance of human capital for reducing 
poverty and promoting economic growth in developing countries.
Notes
I can be reached at the Department of Economics at Northwestern University and 
by  e-mail at seema@northwestern.edu. I am grateful to Jaye Stapleton for excellent 
research assistance.
1. A “head teacher” in Uganda is similar to what in the United States or Great Britain 
would be called a “headmaster,” except that a head teacher often has regular teach-
ing duties in addition to part-time administrative ones.
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